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Abstract 
Since 1994, the pivotal year in which South Africa held its first democratic elections, its 
companies have engaged in a sustained outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) thrust 
with substantial impact on Southern Africa, in the process generating some controversy. 
The paper revisits those debates and updates them in light of recent data and developments 
concerning the evolution of institutions supportive of South African regional OFDI, nota-
bly regulations governing investment and trade respectively. We find that South African 
OFDI to Africa is private sector dominated, concentrated in Southern Africa albeit evinc-
ing a discernible shift to West Africa in recent years, and its impact is on the whole bene-
ficial. However, the actions of the South African government to support the activities of 
their nationals in the region are schizophrenic, particularly in its use of BITs, which seem 
to favour an approach that provides substantial advantages to its companies at the possible 
expense of host-nation policy space. We recommend therefore that in its ongoing review 
of its model approach to BITs the South African government should remedy this ambigu-
ity. 
 
 
Peter Draper, Sheila Kiratu, and Cézanne Samuel Bonn, July 2010 
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1 Introduction 
Since 1994, the pivotal year in which South Africa held its first democratic elections, its 
companies have engaged in a sustained outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) thrust. 
Since South Africa’s economy is so much larger and more diversified than those of its 
neighbours, and indeed the rest of the continent, much of that OFDI has targeted non-
African destinations. But the investment which has found its way into the continent, par-
ticularly Southern Africa, has had substantial impact and in the process generated some 
controversy. That debate raged in the early years of this millennium but fortunately for 
South African policy makers the advent of Chinese OFDI into Africa, and now an emerg-
ing Brazilian and Indian thrust, distracted the attention of those who are critical of the 
process. 
This paper constitutes a desk-top based attempt to revisit those debates and to update them 
in light of recent data and developments concerning the evolution of institutions suppor-
tive of South African regional OFDI, notably regulations governing investment and trade 
respectively. 
Section 2 reviews the purported benefits that South African OFDI into the region brings, 
focused essentially on provision of network services infrastructure which otherwise would 
probably not be built. It qualifies this by noting that South Africa does not have the eco-
nomic muscle to drive economic development through FDI and trade in the manner of Ja-
pan’s impact on Southeast Asia. It also addresses arguments pertaining to the perceived 
costs of such OFDI, but finds most of these arguments do not hold up to scrutiny barring 
potential national security concerns. Even those need to be considered against the mani-
fold development needs of recipient states. Section 3 reviews the data and notes that South 
African OFDI is private sector dominated, and whilst Southern African countries are still 
the largest recipients notes that in recent years there has been a discernible shift to West 
Africa, particularly Nigeria. Section 4 reviews the evolution of regulations relating to in-
vestment in Southern Africa, particularly investment and trade. Concerning the former the 
key framework pursued by the South African government is bilateral investment treaties; 
whereas trade is – at least in principle – fairly comprehensively covered by the Southern 
African Customs Union and Southern African Development Community Arrangements. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2 South Africa’s African FDI: The debate 
Table 1 and Figure 1 (see annex) show that South Africa dominates Southern Africa eco-
nomically; dwarfing the next largest economy, Angola, such that South Africa accounts 
for 58 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the Southern African Develop-
ment Community (SADC) versus Angola’s 17 percent. Furthermore, the South African 
economy is much more diversified than any other in the region; in Angola’s case its GDP 
and exports are overwhelmingly concentrated in the oil sector. The two next largest 
Southern African economies in 2008, Tanzania and Zambia, are both least developed 
countries (LDCs); each accounts for a negligible proportion of the combined SADC GDP 
(4 percent and 3 percent respectively). Zimbabwe, once a regional manufacturing and ag-
ricultural powerhouse, has slipped virtually off the radar screen amidst its ongoing politi-
cal crisis and now has a smaller economy than Botswana. Unsurprisingly, as Table 2 and 
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Figure 2 (see annex) reveal, there is a similar picture on the export front although with 
relatively high oil prices in the first half of 2008 Angola’s export figure is accordingly 
somewhat distorted. 
Consequently South Africa is believed to have substantial impact on growth in other Afri-
can countries (Arora / Vamvakidis 2005), and its outward Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and associated trade expansions are likely to have substantial impacts on its 
neighbours and other countries in the sub-continent. Here we explore the contours of that 
impact by reviewing relevant literature, focusing initially on OFDI then turning to trade 
since it is often closely tied to investment. 
The origins of South Africa’s corporate expansion into Africa lie primarily in the conjunc-
ture of two simultaneous and related processes: the demise of Apartheid; and the end of 
the Cold War and associated triumph of the “Washington consensus” development para-
digm pursued by the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs) globally. The former provided the 
outward impulse; the latter the opportunities as countries across the continent liberalized 
their economies under structural adjustment programmes. Figure 1 (see annex) shows that 
overall regional markets are reasonably open by developing country standards, at least as 
measured by average import tariffs.  
We begin with the alleged costs involved for countries hosting South African FDI, since 
much of the initial debate focused on this issue; then we turn to the purported benefits. We 
conclude with a brief review of trade dimensions and impacts. 
Investment: Costs 
Concrete examples of the direct costs concerning South African OFDI for African host 
states include the citing of twelve South African companies for allegedly looting mineral 
resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UN 2002, cited in Daniel / Naidoo / 
Naida 2003, 386), and alleged flouting of labour standards by some companies (Pillay 
2004).  There is also anecdotal evidence of alleged corporate malfeasance and arrogant 
behaviour reminiscent of Apartheid attitudes.  This is in line with concerns within some 
quarters of the South African government, based on evidence sourced through its missions 
across the continent, that the South African corporate community in general may not be 
behaving like good corporate citizens in host markets.1  
There is also the risk of domestic market dominance: McGregor’s (2004, 2) found that 
some 17 percent of South African investments in Africa enjoyed a market share of greater 
than 75 percent. However, this was offset by the finding that 67 percent of investments 
held less than 25 percent market share. So whilst host governments must be vigilant, it ap-
pears from this evidence that the risk is overstated. Furthermore, the Chinese OFDI thrust 
into Africa is forcing South African (and other) investors on the continent to adjust to the 
competition to up their game and provide better quality products at lower prices (Salter 
2009). Furthermore, the majority of South African investments are small – it is generally 
the large-scale projects that capture the headlines. 
                                                 
1  Discussions with government officials. 
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What of the problem of enclave investment associated with resource-extractive FDI? 
South African FDI is more diversified than that traditionally sourced from developed 
countries, covering network services (telecommunications; finance; transport; and energy).  
Furthermore, the Business Map Foundation noted that in the case of the Mozal aluminium 
smelter in Mozambique, for the first time on the continent a serious and successful attempt 
was made to build linkages to the local economy thereby minimising the potential for en-
clave development (Rumney / Pingo, 21). This indicates a degree of sensitivity on behalf 
of the South African government to regional concerns. Furthermore, the pattern of greater 
market-seeking FDI builds host country markets thereby enhancing long-term prospects 
for economic diversification. Crucially, this process is driven substantially by economic 
reforms in host countries (South Africa Foundation 2004, 20), thus qualifying (although 
not necessarily nullifying) the conventional wisdom that structural adjustment packages 
have caused the continent’s deindustrialization.   
Finally, and in light of a growing international debate on this issue, there is the theoretical 
possibility of South African (and other foreign national) FDI into regional host markets 
posing a national security threat. Moran (2009) identifies three threat typologies concern-
ing M&As:  
1. the host country becomes dependent on the supply of goods and/or services from the 
acquiring firm (sometimes linked to that firm’s home government);  
2. the acquisition would allow transfer of sensitive technology away from the host coun-
try to potential rivals;  
3. The acquisition would allow insertion of potential capability for infiltration, surveil-
lance, or sabotage into the host country.  
Furthermore he notes that for any of these threats to obtain the industry concerned must be 
tightly concentrated, the number of close substitutes limited, and switching costs high. In 
the case of FDI into Southern Africa in general it is relatively easy to imagine conditions 
(1) and (3) obtaining in ‘sensitive sectors’ (network services; defence) but condition (2) is 
fanciful. Furthermore, as noted above South African companies tend to dominate regional 
markets in which they operate since there is not a great deal of competition in those mar-
kets as they remain pretty unattractive to Multinational Corporations (MNCs) owing to 
their small size.  
So if we accept Moran’s analysis then it follows that national security may feature in host 
states’ consideration of South African OFDI into their markets. This would seem to apply 
particularly to investment sourced from parastatals since they are arms of the South Afri-
can government; in a few cases OFDI by these companies is substantial. A related ques-
tion is whether South African OFDI in finance and communications in particular could be 
linked to the South African state’s security interests in the region. Unfortunately it is be-
yond the scope of this paper to address that issue  
Investment: Benefits 
South African FDI flows into the continent are more diversified than those sourced from 
developed countries, with significant flows taking place in network services activities. 
(UNCTAD 2005b, 11) argues that these are driven more by merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activity than greenfield investment, implying that on aggregate they are more 
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market – or asset – rather than resource-seeking. According to the South Africa Founda-
tion (2004, 16) market-seeking FDI, measured on the basis of number of projects, was 
concentrated on SADC markets prior to 2004, whereas FDI into non-traditional African 
markets was targeted primarily at the mining and energy sectors (South Africa Foundation 
2004, 17). 
Hence South African companies are directly contributing to the slow build up of crucial 
productive infrastructure in network services (Draper / Kalaba / Alves 2006). Since most 
African economies face significant challenges in developing their supply-side capacities, 
which in turn is a function of the underdevelopment of network services infrastructure, 
this is to be welcomed. However, given South Africa’s domestic growth problems and the 
relatively small size of its economy there are limits to this process. Consequently South 
Africa’s expansion into the continent in the long-run is unlikely to result in the same dra-
matic development benefits which Japanese FDI wrought in Southeast Asia; in this sense 
the “flying geese” analogy does not hold since there is no other goose available to lead 
from the front once the South African goose is exhausted. 
While concerns about deindustrialisation or crowding out of domestic companies must be 
carefully addressed, the so-called “new scramble for Africa” by South African companies 
is, according to studies based on interviews with South African companies operating on 
the continent, yielding substantial benefits for the continent. These include job creation; 
upgrading of existing and building of new infrastructure including investment in backbone 
services; technology transfer through human resource development (McGregor’s 2004)2; 
increased tax revenues; increased consumer choice; and boosting general investor confi-
dence in host countries (Games 2003; Grobbelaar 2004a).   
Concerning job creation, 24 355 jobs are said to have been created in Mozambique by 
South African companies from 1998–2002 (Grobbelaar 2004b). Similarly, in a survey of 
40 top South African companies invested on the continent McGregor’s (2004, 2) found 
that a total of 71,874 people were employed across 232 investments outside of South Af-
rica. Of these, only 2,257 were South African expatriates, mostly in managerial and tech-
nical positions. It is not clear whether M&A’s associated with these investments have led 
to retrenchments. If so, such job losses would have to be offset against the employment 
numbers cited here. Furthermore, UNIDO (2006, IX) found that South African investors 
pay the highest wages, on average, of all foreign direct investors in Africa. This is partly 
due to the skill-intensive nature of South African subsidiaries. 
Some examples concerning investments in infrastructure are also pertinent. Mobile Tech-
nology Networks (MTN), the South African telecommunications MNC, has had to build 
roads to service rural coverage requirements stipulated by telecommunications licensing 
conditions in several countries (McGregor’s 2004, 2).  The South Africa Foundation 
(2004, 12) noted that 27 percent of projects covered in their survey were in the infrastruc-
ture sector, especially power, whilst telecommunications accounted for 5 percent. South 
                                                 
2  The report notes that most South African investors have a policy of transferring skills to local employees 
over a period of three to five years from the initial investment.  South African companies are particularly 
sensitive to such concerns given the centrality of black economic empowerment policies to their bottom 
line in South Africa. 
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African banks have also expanded rapidly into the continent, in the process upgrading of-
ten antiquated financial systems (Jekwa 2005). 
These benefits are reportedly linked to a general view amongst the South African corpo-
rate community that they are in Africa for the long-term and hence need to play their part 
in sustainable investment. This view has helped them to unseat European competitors 
who, according to McGregor’s (2004, 2), have a reputation for dumping inferior technol-
ogy and quality at premium prices. South African companies are quite prepared to adapt 
products to local market conditions, and in many cases already do so in the domestic mar-
ket (McGregor’s 2004, 3).   
Trade 
In Southern Africa many useful productive inputs and capital equipment items that aren’t 
domestically produced are sourced from South Africa.  The South Africa Foundation 
(2004, 9) noted with respect to South Africa’s exports to the continent that: 
“There is a high proportion of value-added exports to the rest of Africa, with machin-
ery, mechanical appliances, iron and steel articles, transport goods, chemicals, and 
plastics and rubber goods accounting for close to 70% of the total.  This is an impor-
tant consideration, as it ties in with South Africa’s domestic economic structure, 
based traditionally on mining, agriculture, engineering and chemical products, and 
their allied industries.  These are also the areas that are attracting the most (invest-
ment) interest in other African countries.” 
Clearly this does not negate political concerns associated with rising trade imbalances be-
tween South Africa and its neighbours, which feed perceptions of “recolonisation”. In-
deed, there is in all likelihood a strong connection between OFDI by South African com-
panies in these and other sectors, and increasing exports from South Africa. That is be-
cause most of the countries into which such OFDI is destined do not have well-developed 
supply capacities; consequently it makes business sense for the South African companies 
concerned to export from their home base until such time as those products can be com-
petitively sourced in the host market. 
Nonetheless, there is a long history behind regional fears of South African domination, 
most notably the Apartheid state’s destructive destabilization of its neighbours from the 
late 1970s.  However, the charge that this trade imbalance implies exclusively negative 
consequences should be challenged: what matters are the drivers of these imbalances, ra-
ther than the fact of their existence (Corden 1997, chs 17–18; Draper / Freytag 2008). The 
basic point is that if the deficit is driven by imports of productive equipment and other in-
puts, there is little cause for concern in the long-term. Deficits become problematic when 
finished consumer products are their principal drivers. Furthermore, the bulk of the re-
gion’s commodity exports are destined for developed country markets and, increasingly, 
China, whereas South Africa possesses many of those commodities and hence does not 
need to import them from the region.   
Concluding observations 
From this brief survey of the literature, it is apparent to us that on balance South Africa’s 
OFDI footprint and associated trade expansion into (Southern) Africa are mostly positive. 
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Where there are negative impacts these are principally associated with rogue operators and 
sometimes nebulous national security concerns. In the next section we review recent em-
pirical data concerning OFDI in particular in order to gauge the contours of South Africa’s 
regional OFDI thrust.  
3 Updating the analysis: Data review 
Figure 2 (see annex) shows that South Africa’s total OFDI is primarily directed outside 
the Southern African region; the latter rarely exceeded 10 percent of the total between 
1997 and 2007 albeit it showed a tendency to increase from 2001. Furthermore, Table 3 
(see annex) shows that until recently South Africa’s outward FDI to Africa was concen-
trated in SADC countries, particularly Mauritius (see the box). However, it is evident that 
in recent years there has been a substantial shift into the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. This 
may reflect relative saturation of market opportunities in Southern Africa, although it is 
widely expected that two countries in the region will be the target of substantial South Af-
rican OFDI flows in the coming years: Angola and Zimbabwe.3 Nonetheless, the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2009, 67) note that South Af-
rica’s intra-African OFDI flows have shifted from Southern to West Africa in particular, 
presumably representing opening up of opportunities in the latter especially Nigeria – as 
shown in Figure 3 (see annex). 
                                                 
3  President Zuma made his first overseas trip to Luanda in August 2009, and was accompanied by a large 
business delegation eager to take advantage of Angola’s post-conflict reconstruction needs which will 
be financed by its financial windfall owing to the oil price boom. In Zimbabwe’s case, the assumption is 
that within the next few years a sustainable political settlement will be reached; major South African pa-
rastatal organizations and private sector institutions stand poised to reinvest on a significant scale once 
that occurs. Given political uncertainty in Zimbabwe much play has been made of the recently signed 
bilateral investment treaty. 
Box 1: Mauritius 
The data from the SARB shows that out of all the countries in Africa, South Africa has the largest share 
of foreign assets in Mauritius, nearly 30 percent to be precise. While this is interesting it is hardly sur-
prising. Mauritius in recent years has become an internationally acclaimed tax haven. It offers some of 
the most lucrative investment opportunities and was recently voted the best place to do business on the 
African continent according to the World Bank’s Doing Business Report.   
South Africa’s investment is concentrated in the private non-banking sector and specifically in long-
term capital. In UNCTAD’s World Investment Directory for Mauritius, it is shown that the largest South 
African affiliate in the country is an insurance company called Munich Mauritius Reinsurance Company 
(although this is a subsidiary of the European Multinational Munich Re). They offer primary insurance 
and reinsurance. The government has introduced numerous incentives for companies specialising in fi-
nancial services amongst other things.  
Table 3 shows that in 2006 there was a huge increase in South Africa’s OFDI to Mauritius, accounting 
in that year for 33 percent of total FDI into Mauritius. The Board of Investment in Mauritius confirms 
that this FDI was concentrated in the IT and Business Process Outsourcing (IT/BPO) services sector. 
This sector is a substantial contributor to economic growth in Mauritius accounting for 5.7 percent of 
GDP in 2007. This South African investment occurred in line with the development of the Ebene Cyber 
City in the capital of Port Louis, the new information technology hub. In 2007 six South African com-
panies began operations in Mauritius; they were all IT/BPO companies. 
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With regards to the composition of South Africa’s foreign assets in Africa, Figure 4 (see 
annex) shows that direct investment is the dominant form. Table 4 (see annex) shows that 
the private sector, particularly the banking sector, dominates South African OFDI flows. 
Given the large amount of portfolio inflows into South Africa from the rest of the world, it 
may be that those inflows are recycled into FDI outflow into the region; in other words it 
is possible that South Africa’s sophisticated financial markets are being used to channel 
resources across Africa. Parastatal institutions are also significant outward investors into 
the region, but since 19974 this has been primarily concentrated in two Southern African 
countries: Mozambique (associated with the construction of the Mozal Aluminium smelter 
and development of the Maputo corridor); and Lesotho (associated with the Highlands wa-
ter project). Since 2003 public corporations have picked up their OFDI into Namibia and 
Zambia; and in 2007 significant amounts were invested in Nigeria and the rest of Africa. 
Overall, whilst South African OFDI into Southern Africa is a relatively small portion of its 
global footprint, it has grown in recent years and is relatively diversified. In light of the 
discussion in the previous section this growth is to be welcomed, albeit any rough edges 
would need to be attended to. Next we turn to the interesting question regarding the South 
African government’s approach to securing its companies’ OFDI into Southern Africa, 
dealing first with investment related regulations then turning to trade. 
4 Regulations governing South Africa’s OFDI in Southern Africa 
First we address South Africa’s resort and approach to bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 
then we turn to the utility of the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP). In the case 
of BITs South Africa has recently resorted to securing more favourable regulations con-
cerning treatment of its companies, having come from a long history of reliance on inward 
FDI. We also discuss trade related regulations and incentive structures, particularly the 
impact that South African OFDI has on building regional economic integration. This is 
important because securing regional markets through regional integration arrangements is 
in the interest of South African MNCs. 
Investment:  BITs and other international investment agreements 
Given the sizeable intra-Africa investments made by South African companies, the coun-
try is concerned with how best its citizens’ investments may be safeguarded. This raises 
difficult questions with regard to the appropriate model for agreements, bilateral or re-
gional, that contemplate South Africa’s OFDI and that equitably balance investors’ rights 
with the sustainable development needs of African countries. Complicating this situation 
is the fact that South Africa is historically reliant on inward FDI and has had mixed ex-
periences with BITs negotiated with developed country partners (Peterson 2006) which 
are now seen to unduly intrude into domestic policy preferences – especially concerning 
black economic empowerment. 
South African companies and organized business appear to support their government’s 
negotiation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with other African countries. Table 5 
                                                 
4 Data is sourced from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and is available on request. 
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(see annex) shows that South Africa has 5 BITs with countries in the SADC region, of 
which the Democratic Republic of the Congo is really Central African. Interestingly none 
of those countries are members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the gov-
erning agreement of which does not contain any investment protection provisions (Kiratu 
2008). Yet this has not prevented substantial South African investment in those markets 
over many years Mozambique, which has seen substantial South African OFDI not least 
by parastatals; Mauritius – the largest destination country; and Tanzania which is a sub-
stantial investment destination in Southern Africa are covered. Concerning potential OFDI 
destinations in Southern Africa Angola is included in the BIT net, and a BIT with Zim-
babwe has just been signed amidst considerable controversy since the terms exclude land 
acquired since the onset of the Zimbabwean government’s controversial land reform pro-
gramme. The Zimbabwean BIT is motivated by genuine fears from South African inves-
tors that their investments would not be secure in light of the prevailing political-economic 
climate in that country. The East African BIT net seems to be in place, and covers Kenya, 
Uganda, and Rwanda. Interestingly South Africa does not have any BITs with its major 
West African OFDI destinations in Nigeria and Ghana, whereas Senegal is covered. 
Typical clauses in South Africa’s BITs revolve around the scope of an investment, defini-
tion of investment and investor, geographic application of the agreement, duration and 
termination, standards of treatment (national treatment and Most Favoured Nation – 
MFN), expropriation, transfer of funds and dispute resolution. The last item is puzzling to 
see in “South–South” investment agreements because it is widely recognized that this 
model of BITs perpetuates imbalanced relationships (between the home and host states) 
and inequitable outcomes (for the host state). Whereas developing and especially African 
countries want to attract inward investment the usefulness of binding international rules on 
investment is controversial as they tend to limit a host state’s policy choices and do little 
to attract investment (Hallward-Driemeier 2003). Affirmations of a state’s rights to devel-
opment, its right to regulate in the public interest or to pursue other social goals are largely 
absent from these agreements. Even the preambles which are supposed to reaffirm the 
purpose of these treaties, and which may be crucial for later interpretation of the treaty 
provisions in dispute settlement contexts, are bereft of reference to more ambitious social 
or developmental goals.   
The World Bank study (Hallward-Driemeier 2003) concluded that investment rules found 
in BITs had little impact on investment decisions and warned that these could “expose 
policy makers to potentially large scale liabilities and curtail the feasibility of different 
policy options as is demonstrated by the recent tide of investor-state arbitrations challeng-
ing government measures pursuant to investment rules.” South Africa is acutely aware of 
this imbalance having being subjected to judicial processes5 that challenge its public pol-
icy stances, resulting in the Department of Trade and Industry’s recent assessment as to 
whether investment rules strike the right balance between investor protection and the res-
ervation of host state policy space.6 Now that the country understands the potential impact 
                                                 
5  The current pending dispute in which Italian investors are challenging South Africa’s Black Economic 
Empowerment Code is an example of how public policy goals can be challenged under BITs. See fur-
ther, Piero Foresti and others vs. Republic of South Africa ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1); online: 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet  
6  South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaty Review accessible at http://www.thedti.gov.za/ads/bi-lateral_ 
policy.pdf. 
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of BITs on a country’s domestic policies and the need to inject greater balance in such 
agreements, it will be interesting to watch if it will continue to negotiate BITs in the re-
gion that seem to be stacked in favour of South African investors without the necessary 
safeguards to preserve flexibility in critical policy areas for African countries.  
Furthermore, whereas this model gives investors rights against the excesses of govern-
ments there are no comparable rights for governments. In the region this creates a situation 
where smaller county governments cannot discipline the excesses of South African com-
panies without political consequences and the risk of being sued. The South African gov-
ernment is cognizant of this imbalance, from a host state perspective, and its aforemen-
tioned assessment argues that any new BIT template arising out of the review should cre-
ate obligations for home states that may be expected to provide certain information, assist 
in combating corruption and ensure that investor liability extends to the home state in an 
appropriate manner. The fact that South Africa, through its OFDI in the region, is also a 
home state means that it should be in a position to shoulder obligations that it would like 
to level on other home states in terms of any new BIT template that may arise out of this 
review. 
In South Africa’s BITs protection for investors is offered only in the post-establishment 
phase; in other words pre-establishment rights are not accorded. South Africa’s BITs nor-
mally include MFN exceptions which permit the contracting parties to deny investors of 
the other contracting party more favourable treatment resulting from either’s membership 
of a regional trade arrangement (RTA) where the other party is not a member. The ration-
ale for this exception stems from the nature of regional economic integration which pur-
ports to grant privileges to the member countries in exchange for reciprocal preferential 
treatment. This exception prevents these privileges from being extended to those contract-
ing parties of BITs that are not members of the RTA concerned.   
In addition to the above BITs South Africa has ratified the agreement on investment pro-
tection and promotion in SADC, the Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP). The South 
African Treasury was a key motivator behind this agreement, reflecting its desire to make 
the region more secure for investment in general, and presumably South African OFDI in 
particular.7 Annex 1 (Investment) of the FIP creates a framework for FDI promotion in 
SADC and in some aspects emulates the provisions typical of BITs. However, this instru-
ment only seems to cater for inward FDI and does not cater for intra-SADC investment, a 
factor that is directly relevant to South Africa in respect of its sizable investments in the 
region.  
Unlike most regional treaties, however, the FIP’s benefits are not limited to the treaty sig-
natories. For example the definition of investor in the FIP extends to any persons admitted 
to make an investment in the SADC region, thus it does not accord any preference to 
SADC member states. The status of the FIP contrasts with the Common Market for East-
ern and Southern Africa’s (COMESA) Regional Investment Agreement (CRIA) which 
only applies to COMESA member states, that is it caters for intra-COMESA investment. 
The CRIA also provides for both pre and post establishment national treatment and MFN 
                                                 
7  Remarks made by a senior Treasury official at a closed seminar on the FIP. 
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treatment. Furthermore, 8 out of 15 SADC member states are member states of COMESA 
which raises questions about which agreement should prevail.  
Overall, it is essential for South Africa to carefully assess the risks and benefits associated 
with the different agreements it is party to and to understand how they inter-relate. The 
government should also analyze the efficacy of “regional investment agreements” which 
can easily be held ransom to political processes that can delay ratification. For example, 4 
SADC members have not ratified the FIP and experience in the region shows that proto-
cols take, on average, two and half years to implement due to difficulties in domesticating 
the obligations and Protocols into the legal sphere of Member States.  
South Africa and Southern African economic integration  
South African OFDI and trade with Southern African countries, and associated develop-
ment of investment regulations, are mirrored in development of regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) and deeper forms of integration. RTAs are important complements to investment 
since they allow goods to flow relatively freely to and from subsidiaries located in foreign 
locations that are part of the RTA, and as such promote a favourable investment climate. 
This depends somewhat on the coverage of the RTA concerned; for our purposes the most 
relevant provisions concern trade in goods and, where possible, regulations concerning 
“trade” in services including movement of people associated with corporate personnel. 
Considered holistically provisions which liberalize these regulations should have the 
added benefit of promoting regional value-chains and integrated production, thereby de-
veloping economies of scale to compete beyond the immediate sub-region.  
In this light South African OFDI into Southern Africa has been aided by the two RTAs 
that South Africa is part of: the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). Unlike BITs which largely offer protection 
clauses, the SACU agreement and SADC’s Trade Protocol cover not only free movement 
of goods but also in the case of SADC and via various protocols, mooted competition po-
licies, proposed liberalization of FDI in services, proposed harmonization of broader prop-
erty rights and contract enforcement, provide access to a large market and stable and pre-
dictable trade policies. These regulatory harmonization initiatives are important for inves-
tors since they level the playing field and promote smooth transfer of assets and the con-
duct of business. However, whilst numerous such initiatives have been negotiated, imple-
mentation has been patchy. 
The South African government has actively promoted the use of trade instruments in the 
region particularly through tariff liberalization incorporating both SACU and SADC: the 
former is characterised by duty free movement of goods within the customs union; the lat-
ter has established a free trade area. As things currently stand the South African govern-
ment’s broad vision continues to promote the former as the building block of the latter. 
Unfortunately, it has been complicated by ongoing political ructions concerning the prob-
lem of overlapping memberships8 (Draper / Halleson / Alves 2007) and negotiations con-
cerning establishment of economic partnership agreements with the European Union 
(Draper 2009). This has led the South African government to rethink the utility of SACU, 
                                                 
8  Whereby countries in the region are members of two or more regional groupings. 
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and in light of this what approach should be taken to SADC as the broader region moves 
to resolve the overlap problem through potentially establishing a SADC-COMESA-EAC 
(East African Community) RTA in some form.  
Overall, the record concerning RTAs from the South African business community’s per-
spective is rather mixed, with the substantial exception of regional tariff liberalization 
which, though patchily implemented, presumably encourages exports and associated FDI. 
5 Concluding remarks 
Overall we find that South African OFDI is essentially beneficial to its (Southern) African 
hosts. Notwithstanding the fact that far more South African OFDI is destined for non-
African shores, but also increasingly for West Africa, this is an important factor in South-
ern African economic development.  
Concerning regulatory support by the South African government to the activities of their 
nationals in the region, we find that trade regulations concerning goods are appropriately 
specified, albeit the regulatory dimensions are not and are bedevilled by a host of chal-
lenges. Consequently investment-related regulations are important, but the South African 
government’s approach appears to be schizophrenic - particularly in its use of BITs. On 
the one hand South Africa is a major recipient of inward FDI, which is regulated by many 
BITs signed with developed country governments, and has recently been subjected to in-
ternational arbitration which it found intruded uncomfortably into its domestic policy 
space. On the other hand it seems to favour an approach to BITs with African countries 
that provide substantial advantages to its companies. This ambiguity may be remedied 
through its ongoing review of its model approach to BITs, and is the one concrete recom-
mendation arising from this paper. 
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Figure 1: SADC countries’ MFN applied tariffs, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  SAIIA’s calculations from UNCTAD data 
Figure 2: SA OFDI to SADC countries versus total OFDI 
 
 
 
Source:  SAIIA’s calculations from SARB data 
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Figure 3: SA OFDI stock in West Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SAIIA’s calculations from SARB data 
Figure 4: SA foreign assets in Africa by type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  SAIIA’s calculations from SARB data 
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Table 1: SADC member states GDP 2008, US Dollars (billions),  
 current prices 
Country GDP 
South Africa 277 
Angola 83 
Tanzania 21 
Zambia 14 
Botswana 13 
Zimbabwe 12 
DRC 12 
Mozambique 10 
Madagascar 9 
Mauritius 9 
Namibia 8 
Malawi 4 
Swaziland 3 
Lesotho 2 
Seychelles 1 
Total 478 
Source: SAIIA’s calculations from SARB data 
Table 2: SADC member states exports 2007, US Dollars at current  
 prices in millions 
ECONOMY Amount 
SA 69,788 
Angola 41,109 
Zambia 4,853 
Botswana 4,005 
Namibia 3,433 
DRC 2,531 
Mozambique 2,492 
Swaziland 2,171 
Mauritius 2,054 
Tanzania 2,005 
Zimbabwe 1,995 
Madagascar 1,156 
Malawi 813 
Lesotho 795 
SADC Total 139,200 
Source: UNCTAD Database 
 Peter Draper / Sheila Kiratu / Cézanne Samuel 
 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 22 
 
 
Data note: 
When calculating investment flow data one would need to calculate the exchange rate to value the transac-
tion at the time of it taking place. This will then be added to all other transactions in that period to find the 
final FDI flow. Information about each transaction could plausibly be collected from the exchange control 
department at the South African Reserve Bank however this would not be complete as a lot of these ap-
proved transactions never materialise. Therefore, the flows are calculated by subtracting each year's stock 
value from the previous for simplicity sake while it is acknowledged that it might not be entirely correct. 
 
 
Table 3: SA’s foreign assets in SADC countries and Africa, 2003–2007, US$ million 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Share 2003 Share 2007 
Botswana 197.7 222.6 229.9 334.6 625.4 4.6 % 3.8 % 
Lesotho 152.6 164.1 155.3 216.7 190.4 3.6 % 1.1 % 
Swaziland 181.2 200.7 168.8 344.6 385.3 4.2 % 2.3 % 
Namibia 658.5 595.3 675.7 567.2 569.5 15.4 % 3.4 % 
Zimbabwe 354.7 159.9 227.7 265.2 404.9 8.3 % 2.4 % 
Mauritius 1116.7 1535.1 811.0 5230.2 4974.1 26.2 % 30.0 % 
Mozambique 871.8 962.1 1040.0 1055.4 1204.1 20.4 % 7.3 % 
Zambia 160.4 233.3 278.8 346.9 378.7 3.8 % 2.3 % 
Rest of Africa 572.9 1604.0 2187.3 3428.5 7850.3 13.4 % 47.3 % 
Total 4266.5 5677.2 5774.7 11789.1 16582.6 100.0 % 100.0 % 
Source:  SAIIA’s calculations from SARB data 
Table 4: South African OFDI flows to Africa by major institutions, 1997–2007,  
 Rands (millions) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Monetary  
authority 114 109 72 73 75 70 62 31 75 74 75 
Public  
authorities 83 82 79 79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Public  
corpora-
tions 357 621 4399 6111 6983 9944 7873 7373 7848 8997 12398 
Banks 696 1430 5396 6714 9068 9160 10701 6110 9074 7561 17548 
Private  
sector 8090 13331 10492 11178 10675 10835 13663 23154 19845 63394 87206 
Real estate 18 14 15 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: SAIIA’s calculations from SARB data 
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Table 5: South African bilateral investment agreements in Africa 
Country Date of Signature 
Algeria 24-Sep-00 
Angola 17-Feb-05 
Democratic Republic of Congo 31-Aug-04 
Egypt 28-Oct-98 
Equatorial Guinea 17-Feb-04 
Ethiopia 1-Jan-08 
Kenya  
Libya 14-Jun-02 
Mauritius 17-Feb-98 
Mozambique 6-May-97 
Rwanda 19-Oct-00 
Senegal 5-Jun-98 
Tanzania 22-Sep-05 
Uganda 8-May-00 
Zimbabwe Negotiations underway 
Source:  Department of Trade and Industry; as of October 2009 
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